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Abstract
This article presents a critical analysis of the principles behind the scope and forms of 
cooperation between EU Member States and third-country resolution authorities in the context 
of the 2014 Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. The article also explores the future 
responsibilities of the prospective Single Resolution Authority regarding relations between the 
euro area and third-country resolution authorities.
Keywords: European Union, banks, international economics, bankruptcy.
JEL classifi cation: F39, G18,  G33, G38, K33, L51.
Resumen
Este artículo realiza un análisis crítico de los principios que inspiran el alcance y las formas de 
cooperación entre las autoridades responsables de la restructuración y resolución de entidades 
de crédito de los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea con sus homólogos de terceros 
países, en el marco de la Directiva de Restructuración y Resolución de Entidades de Crédito 
de 2014. Además, este artículo explora las competencias de la futura Autoridad Europea de 
Resolución en el ámbito de la cooperación con terceros países.
Palabras clave: Unión Europea, bancos, gestión de crisis, liquidación, economía internacional.
Códigos JEL: F39, G18,  G33, G38, K33, L51.
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1- Introduction 
The introduction of the Directive for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions 
(RRD)2 explicitly recognizes that effective resolution of internationally active institutions 
requires cooperation between the Union, Member States and third country resolution 
authorities. 3
Whether expansion takes place via branches or subsidiaries (EU international banking 
groups favor subsidiaries over branches -around two thirds of their activity- in their 
foreign expansion), arrangements between national authorities responsible for managing 
the resolution of crisis of international banks should ensure effective planning, decision 
making and coordination of action. (e.g. granting and withdrawing licenses).   The 
Directive (RRD) aims to provide national authorities within EU jurisdictions with a broad 
range of powers and tools to effectively resolve a bank that is no longer viable and has no 
reasonable prospect of becoming so (see Annex for a description of bank resolution general 
  This is a welcome consideration given the degree of internationalization and 
the geographical diversification of the major European cross-border banking groups as 
well as the important presence of non-EU international banks in the EU. 
                                                          
2 European Parliament legislative resolution of 15 April 2014 on the proposal for a regulation of the 
European Parliament and of the Council establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the 
resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution 
Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council (COM (2013)0520 – C7-0223/2013 – 2013/0253(COD)). 
 
3 The RRD does not define “cooperation” but  it establishes that cooperation should aim at: (a) a group 
resolution scheme and (b) prevent fragmented national responses.  It is an all encompassing concept that 
includes information sharing and joint decision making.  The terms “cooperation” and “coordination” are 
often used interchangeably.    
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principles and tools as envisaged in the RRD). The Directive is based on the common principles 
and best governance practices enshrined in the Key Attributes of Effective resolution 
regimes.4
The rest of this paper is organized in four sections in addition to this introduction.  The 
second section describes some stylized facts of cross border banking in the EU.  The third 
part presents the inspiring principles and their exceptions as well as the scope of 
cooperation with the third party resolution authorities.  It also makes some reflections 
about the single point of entry (SPE) and multiple point of entry (MPE) resolution 
strategies in the context of the Directive.   Section four presents a reflection of third party 
relations in the context of the prospective Single Resolution Authority.    The last section 
concludes.    
   The RRD establishes that the objectives of resolution authorities are to ensure 
the continuity of critical functions; to avoid significant adverse effects on financial 
stability, including to prevent contagion and to protect insured depositors and client 
relations, while minimizing the public and private costs of resolution (Article 26).   
Cooperation with third countries resolution authorities will be facilitated if their resolution 
regimes are also consistent with those principles; hence, the importance of international 
coordination.  
 
                                                          
4  Financial Stability Board Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes are new international standard for 
the reform of national resolution regimes that sets out the responsibilities, instruments and powers that all 
national resolution regimes should have to enable authorities to resolve failing financial firms in an orderly 
manner and without exposing the taxpayer to the risk of loss (see 
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104cc.pdf accessed 28 January, 2014) 
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2- Cross border international banking:  From and to the EU 
From the point of view of the international banks, the choice of expansion between 
subsidiaries or branches is not only influenced by differences in regulation and corporate 
tax rates across home and host countries, or differential treatment of overseas profits 
from branches and subsidiaries (e.g., the United Kingdom), but also by organizational 
considerations.  Fiechter et alli. (2011) argue that the funding costs for the wholesale 
group are likely to be lower under the branch structure, given the flexibility to move funds 
to where they are most needed.  International banks with important investment banking 
activities such as Goldman Sachs, J P Morgan Chase and Deutsche Bank, which are 
structured centrally for a more efficient use of group capital and liquidity heavily rely on 
branches.    In turn, a subsidiary structure puts constraints on the banking group’s ability 
to transfer funds across borders and could be less suitable for wholesale activities. For a 
global retail bank, however, a more decentralized subsidiary model may work better 
because of its focus on serving local retail clients and its reliance on local deposits and local 
deposit guarantees.  This is the case of lenders as HSBC, BBVA and Santander, which are 
organized geographically.   
  In practice, even if international banks choose one legal form over the other (i.e. 
subsidiaries vs branches) to enter a particular country, most cross-border banking groups 
have rather complex organizational structures.  They run operations through a mixed 
structure that includes both branches and subsidiaries in different jurisdictions. 
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In Europe (i.e. in EU and non-EU countries), international banking groups’ preference for 
subsidiaries is pronounced.  However, differences among countries are significant.  For 
example, entry into the UK, Austria and Luxemburg banking systems takes place most 
often via branches;  while, in Switzerland, Portugal, Belgium and, to a lesser extent France, 
it takes place via subsidiaries.  In the US, the foreign banking groups use subsidiaries as 
well. In Latin-American, the share of foreign activities carried out through subsidiaries is 
even larger.  In Asia most activities are carried out via branches, particularly in Japan and, 
to a lesser extent in China.  However, there is a need to distinguish between retail and 
wholesale banking because several jurisdictions require foreign banks to set up 
subsidiaries to take deposits from the public.   
 
International banks´ motives for the choice of model of establishment in non-EU countries 
are broadly the same as for the case of the EU:  acquisition of local banks allows a faster 
establishment in markets, particularly in retail banking that heavily relies on the value of 
the local franchise.  The UK and US remain the far most important host countries in terms 
of bank assets held by foreign entities.   
 
Fiechter et alli. (2011) conclude that from the supervisors´ (or resolution authorities´) 
perspective, the trade-off between their objectives and those of the international bank  
vary depending on a country’s status as home or host to international banking groups. 
Home authorities might prefer the subsidiary model when their banks expand into 
countries with weak economies and a risky business environment (i.e. not fully convertible 
currencies; capital controls).   Host authorities might also prefer that model, because it 
allows them to shield the affiliate from the problems of its parent (i.e. requiring higher 
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capital/provisions).  Nonetheless, the key to ensuring financial stability lies in whatever 
the model (subsidiary or branch) in the design of effective mechanisms to supervise and 
resolve cross-border banking groups. These include effective home/host prudential 
supervision and information-sharing arrangements; satisfactory cross-border resolution 
regimes as well as burden sharing agreements of financial crisis costs.   
Within the EU, effective cooperation is the inspiring principle of the Capital Requirement 
Directive IV and Capital Requirement Regulation5
 
 (CRD IV and CRR IV) in the realm of 
supervision and of the RRD establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of 
credit institutions.  From the view point of financial stability, the regulatory distinction 
between significant branches and subsidiaries of international banks has been significantly 
blurred by the similar treatment of systemic branches and subsidiaries for the purpose of 
coordination among competent authorities including information sharing.   Cooperation 
between EU prudential supervisors / resolution authorities and third country authorities is 
also the inspiring principle of the relation as described in detail in the next section. 
3- Third country relations in the recovery and resolution Directive  
                                                          
5 Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and 
investment firms, amending Directive 2002/87/EC and repealing Directives 2006/48/EC and 
2006/49/EC, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013.
Regulation (EU) No 575/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on 
prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms and amending 
Regulation (EU) No 648/2012, OJ L 176, 27.6.2013. 
Title VI of the RRD deals with different aspects of cooperation with third countries´ 
resolution authorities, namely the inspiring principles and their exceptions; the legal 
framework for cooperation agreements; their scope and obligation of confidentiality.   
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References to cooperation with third country national resolution authorities in the context 
of resolution colleges are included in previous articles of the RRD (Articles 80 and 81).    
3.1 Inspiring principles and exceptions 
The principle that inspires relations with third countries is that of recognition and 
enforcement of their resolution proceedings, which is consistent with Key Attributes of 
Effective resolution regimes.  Member States shall ensure, ideally at the time of licensing or 
launching the supervisory and resolution colleges  that resolution authorities are empowered to 
do the following (Article 85):  
- exercise the resolution powers in relation to the following: 
(i) assets of a third country institution that are located in their Member State or 
governed by the law of their Member State; 
(ii) rights or liabilities of a third country institution that are booked by the 
domestic branch in their Member State or governed by the law of their 
Member State, or where claims in relation to such rights and liabilities are 
enforceable in their Member State; 
- perfect, including to require another person to take action to perfect, a transfer of 
shares or instruments of ownership in a domestic subsidiary institution established in 
the designating Member State; 
- exercise the powers to (a) suspend certain obligations pursuant any contract to which 
any institution under resolution is a party except eligible deposits, payment and 
delivery obligations owed to payment systems, central counterparties and central 
banks (Article 61); (b) restrict the enforcement of secured creditors from enforcing 
security interest in relation to any asset of the institution under resolution (Article, 
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62) or (c) suspend termination rights of any party to a contract with a subsidiary of an 
institution under resolution from publication of the notice until midnight (Article 63);  
- Render unenforceable any contractual right to:  
i) terminate, liquidate or accelerate contracts of, or  
ii)  to affect the contractual rights of  the subsidiary and / or domestic branches of 
third country banks  established in the EU that are regarded as significant by two or 
more Member States, where such right arises from resolution action taken in 
respect of the third country institution or parent undertaking of such entities, 
whether by the third country resolution authority itself or otherwise pursuant to 
legal or regulatory requirements as to resolution arrangements in that country, 
provided that the substantive obligations under the contract, including payment 
and delivery obligations, and provision of collateral, continue to be performed. 
 
The RRD implies that cooperation with third countries will be based on common 
principles, powers, tools and approaches; which, in turn, are in line with best international 
practices as developed by the Financial Stability Board in the Key Attributes.  Otherwise, 
the RRD also envisages that Member States have the right to refuse recognition in the 
case of branches of institutions having their head office in third countries because host 
countries do not enjoy the legal protection of the Union Law as is the case with 
subsidiaries of third country international banking groups.  Under what circumstances a 
Member State has the right to refuse to recognize or enforce a third country resolution 
proceeding?   The RRD (Article 86) envisages the following circumstances: 
– the third country resolution proceeding  would have an adverse impact on 
financial stability in the Member State (or another Member State);  
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– independent resolution action in relation to a domestic branch is necessary 
to achieve one or more of the resolution objectives established in the RRD 
(Article 26); 
– domestic creditors (depositors) would not receive equal treatment in the 
third country.  For example, the FSA (UK) proposed that firms from non-EEA 
countries that operate national depositor preference regimes (e.g. United 
States) be required to accept deposits in the UK using a UK-incorporated 
subsidiary or they must implement an alternative arrangement that 
ensures UK depositors are no worse off than the depositors in the home 
country if the firm fails.  In 2012, the FSA proposed ban of non-EEA bank 
branches taking deposits unless they have protection;6
– the enforcement of  third country resolution proceedings would have 
material negative fiscal implications for the Member State; 
 
– effects of recognition or enforcement would be contrary to public policy. 
Hence,  the RRD ensures that Member States have the powers necessary to act in relation 
to a domestic branch that is either not subject to any third country resolution proceeding 
or that being subject to it, would have an undesirable impact on its economy or  would be 
contrary to its laws and regulations.  The underlying assumption seems to be that the 
third country resolution framework is not consistent with the Key Attributes of Effective 
Resolution Regimes.  
                                                          
6. See http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/cp/cp12-23.pdf.  
 
What are the conditions for national resolution authorities of any Member State to 
resolve a branch of a third country bank?  The principles should always be consistent with 
those stated in the RRD (Article 26) and at least one of the following conditions should be 
met (Article 86): 
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– branch of a third country bank that no longer meets or is likely not to meet 
the conditions imposed by law for its authorization and operation, and 
there is no prospect of any private sector solution (e.g. acquisition by a 
sound bank); 
– no third country resolution proceeding have been or will be initiated in a 
reasonable timeframe and the branch is/likely unable /unwilling to pay its 
domestic creditors; 
– third country has initiated /notified the Member State resolution authority 
and the Member State refuses to recognize the third country resolution 
regime on the grounds that  the exceptions meet any of the circumstances 
described in Article 86  (see above). 
These RRD inspiring principles and exceptions are broadly consistent with the Financial 
Stability Board recommendations regarding resolution of cross border banks.  
The RRD is neutral regarding resolution strategies whether single point of entry or 
multiple point of entry is preferable to the extent that the general objectives of resolution 
as stated in the RRD are met.  Also, the RRD removes obstacles to sharing information 
among resolution authorities.   
 
3.2 What bank financial structures are covered by the recovery and resolution 
Directive? 
Cooperation is envisaged to take place both with regard to subsidiaries of third country 
internationally active financial institutions and groups (including parent financial or mixed 
financial holdings) and with regard to branches of third country internationally active 
financial institutions and groups. 
A subsidiary of a third country international banking group is a separate legal entity, which 
is legally incorporated in the EU and supervised by Member States´ prudential supervisors, 
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with the parent bank having no legal obligation to support it if it falls into distress, 
although reputational risks are always a consideration.  These subsidiaries are fully subject 
to Union law including the RRD.   In contrast, a branch of a third country international 
banking institution is legally inseparable from that institution, which is ultimately 
responsible for its financial commitments and it is subject to prudential supervision and 
crisis management proceedings in the third country.  Despite a clear legal distinction 
between branches and subsidiaries, however, both may in practice sometimes be 
operated and managed in a similar fashion. In some countries, branches work effectively 
as independent banks (i.e. Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, India, and Korea, 
branches face local capital and liquidity charges identical to those applied to subsidiaries – 
Fiechter et alli, 2011); while, subsidiaries may function similarly to branches when they  
are dependent on their parents for funding.   In the EU, the distinction between systemic 
branches and subsidiaries is somewhat blurred by requiring their national competent 
authorities to be both members of the supervisory and resolution colleges.  Also, host 
Member States retain responsibility in cooperation with the competent authorities of the 
home Member State for the supervision of liquidity of the branches of credit institutions 
(Article 156, CRD IV). 
Figures 1 to 3 show the different bank structures envisaged in the RRD regarding 
agreements on cooperation between EU resolution authorities and third country 
resolution authorities.  The figures represent examples of group structures -not 
necessarily real- as envisaged in the RRD and included in the heading of each figure.    In 
practice, EU banks use some of these group structures or very similar in their international 
activity (i.e. Citibank, Santander, BBVA). 
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Figure 1: A third country parent institution has subsidiary institutions or significant branches in 
two or more Member States 
RRD also envisages the case of third country institutions that have rights or liabilities located in or 
governed by the law of that Member State. 
 
Figure 2:  A parent undertaking established in a Member State and which has a 
subsidiary or a significant branch in at least one other Member State has one or more 
third country subsidiary institutions 
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3.3 Cooperation framework with third country resolution authorities 
In accordance with the Treaty (Article 218 TFEU), the Commission may submit to the 
Council proposals for negotiation of  agreements with one or more third countries 
regarding the means of cooperation between the resolution authorities and the relevant third 
country authorities, inter alia, for the purpose of information sharing in connection with recovery 
and resolution planning in relation to institutions, financial institutions, parent undertakings and 
third country institutions (Article 84 of the RRD). Such agreements will be among national 
competent authorities and will not be institution specific cooperation agreements for 
Figure 3: An institution established in a Member State and which has a parent 
undertaking, a subsidiary or a significant branch in at least one other Member State has 
one or more branches in a third country 
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planning and crisis resolution (COAGs in the FSB Key Attributes).7
Until the entry into force of such agreements, the RRD envisages that EU national 
competent authorities may enter into bilateral non-binding cooperation agreements with 
resolution authorities ultimately responsible for subsidiaries or branches located outside 
the EU (see Section 3.2 above that shows the different international bank group 
structures).
   In this regard, the RRD 
is rather broad in its definition of institution that encompasses individual institutions, 
financial institutions, parent undertakings or third country institutions. 
8
                                                          
7 As envisaged in the FSB Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes, institution specific cooperation 
agreements (COAGs) establish the objectives and processes for cooperation between home and host 
authorities for individual banks through Crisis Management Groups (KA 9). 
  As envisaged in the RRD, the European Banking Authority (EBA) may also 
conclude non-binding framework cooperation arrangements with third country resolution 
authorities.  Such arrangements are not legally binding upon Member States and they are 
not mutually exclusive with the bilateral agreements.  That is, Member States´ resolution 
authorities may enter into bilateral agreements with third country resolution authorities 
at the same time that EBA has a non binding cooperation agreement with the same third 
country responsible authority. Nonetheless, Member States are obliged to notify EBA of 
any such cooperation agreement that they subscribe in order to avoid the scope for 
overlaps, under laps, and inconsistencies.    Here the RRD seems to put EBA and the national 
competent authorities on an equal foot regarding cooperation on bank resolution with 
 
8  At present, national prudential supervisors can enter into institution specific MoU with third country 
competent authorities concerning only one credit institution.  Such MoU envisages more specific and 
intensive information exchange; it enhances consolidated supervision, and facilitates joint work and decision 
making. Usually it contains provisions regarding the organization of colleges and crisis management. 
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third country resolution authorities.  Enhanced coordination within the EU and with third 
country resolution authorities allows for better internalization of the potential negative 
spill overs resulting from the decisions of resolution authorities of non EU countries. 
 In this vein, third country resolution authorities could participate as observers in 
Resolution Colleges (Article 80).  Designed for authorities of Member States, Resolution 
Colleges should take a coordinated position on whether third country resolution 
proceedings should be recognized.  Also, resolution authorities of third countries, where a 
parent bank (or holding company) established in the EU has a subsidiary or significant 
branch, could participate as observers in the Resolution Colleges (see Figures 2 and 3 
above), provided that the third country resolution authority is subject to confidentiality 
requirements comparable to those in the EU. 
Where a third country bank or third country parent undertaking has subsidiary institutions 
established in, or two or more branches that are regarded as significant by two or more 
Member States (see Figure 1 above), the resolution authorities of Member States where 
those subsidiary institutions in the Union are legally incorporated shall establish a 
European resolution college (Article 81).  Such European resolution colleges are meant to 
perform the same functions of the resolution colleges designed for authorities of Member 
States as envisaged in Article 80 with respect to the subsidiary or the significant branch.   
European resolution colleges are to be chaired by the resolution authority of the 
consolidating supervisor, if no consolidating supervisor exists, the resolution authorities of 
the Member States will decide on the chair of the resolution college.  The RRD also 
envisages the possibility of waiving the requirement of European resolution colleges if 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 21 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1409
other groups or colleges, including a resolution college established under Article 80, 
perform the same functions and carry out the same tasks of European resolution colleges 
and comply with all the conditions and procedures, including those covering membership 
and participation.   
Bilateral and EBA agreements with third country resolution authorities outside the EU aim 
at establishing processes for sharing information for carrying out tasks and exercising 
powers that are consistent with the governance of effective resolution regimes as 
enshrined in the RRD and consistent with the FSB Key Attributes.  Such processes should 
be established at the time of entering into those agreements and definitely before the 
bank enters into resolution. 
 Promising areas of cooperation in the context of EBA and bilateral cooperation 
agreements are those related to the transfer of funds or capital from the parent bank to 
the subsidiary as an alternative to bail-in; the location of gone concern loss absorbing 
capacity within the international banking group; treatment of intragroup liabilities in 
resolution as well as international legal enforceability and mutual recognition of the home 
and host laws under which debt considered loss absorbing are issued (i.e. requiring 
liabilities issued under non EU law debt to contain contractual features recognizing that 
they are subject to the EU resolution authority´s powers to absorb losses of a bank a as 
gone concern).    
 The RRD cannot be prescriptive about particular arrangements with third country 
authorities such as resolution strategies (i.e multiple point of entry vs single point of 
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entry) and it recommends matters of cooperation (Article 88.3):  Development of 
resolution plans; assessment of the resolvability and the application of powers to address 
or remove impediments to resolvability;  application of early intervention measures (or 
consultation of parties to the cooperation arrangement before taking action) and 
resolution tools as well as the exercise of resolution powers;  coordination of public 
communication and establishment and operation of crisis management groups.   
Because cooperation arrangements led either by EBA or EU national authorities with third 
country resolution authorities heavily rely on the exchange of information, they are 
subject to confidentiality rules (Article 89). Third country authorities should be subject to 
similar standards of professional secrecy;   information being exchanged should be 
considered necessary for the performance by the third country authorities of their 
resolution functions and not used for other purposes.  Moreover, confidential information 
provided from one Member State to another cannot be disclosed to third country 
authorities unless the former agrees to that disclosure and only for the sole authorized 
purpose.  Against this background, nothing seems to preclude, provided authorities have the 
legal capacity to enter into such agreements, the possibility of bilateral legally binding 
agreements with third party competent authorities regarding certain aspects of bank crisis 
resolution, such as a common resolution strategy and the implementation of common 
resolution tools.  However, legally binding agreements seem unlikely because national 
authorities are expected to keep intentionally vague on the possibility of temporary access 
to public funds since any obligation on signatories of such bilateral agreement to grant 
access to public funds could interfere with countries´ fiscal sovereignty.  
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Non binding bilateral agreements are particularly suited for countries with highly 
integrated banking systems and very similar resolution regimes in terms of objectives and 
tools, such as the UK and the US.9  The top seven large cross-border US banks have 
approximately 66 percent of the total reported foreign activity located in the UK   
(Azevedo, 2012).  Against this background, the US (FDIC) and the UK (Bank of England) 
have agreed a common resolution strategy that takes control of the failed banking group 
at the top of the group by home authorities, imposing losses on shareholders and 
unsecured creditors (single receivership at parent holding company). 10
 
  The bilateral 
agreement does not preclude other resolution strategies for US and UK banks, based on 
multiple point of entry or mixed single receivership at parent holding company and 
multiple point of entry.   
 
                                                          
9 In the US, the long-standing special resolution regime for insured US banks is based on FDI Act 1950 and 
subsequent enhancements in 1987 (bridge banks), 1991 (least cost resolution) and 1993 (depositor 
preference).  The resolution tools for insured banks include P&A, bridge banks; open bank assistance and 
liquidation procedures.  The Dodd-Frank Act 2010 extends resolution powers to other financial institutions 
whose failure could be systemic, including bank and financial holding companies; it introduces recovery and 
resolution planning requirements for US G-SIBG-SIBs and outlaws open bank assistance.  In the UK, the 
Banking Act 2009 introduced a special resolution regime for UK banks and building societies with similar 
resolution tools.  The Financial Services Act 2012 introduces resolution powers for UK investment firms, 
financial holding and affiliated companies of banks and investment firms, and central counterparties (CCPs).  
The Banking Reform Bill 2012 introduces explicit bail in power as an additional resolution tool; mandate 
primary loss-absorbing capacity at ring-fenced banks and G SIFIS and introduce insured depositor 
preference.     
10 In the US, the Orderly Liquidation Authority in Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act empowers the FDIC under 
extraordinary circumstances where failure of a financial institution would clearly present systemic risks: (a) 
to impose losses on shareholders and creditors and (b) to enable resolution in an orderly manner.  
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Box:  An economic analysis of the Single Point of Entry resolution strategy 
The single receivership at parent holding company resolution strategy is meant to be used 
only in those extraordinary circumstances where a financial institution’s failure and 
resolution under UK and US laws that would otherwise apply would cause severe adverse 
effects on financial stability. This is expected to allow continuity of all critical services 
because the subsidiaries (foreign and domestic) would remain open for business and 
operating with access to sufficient liquidity (FDIC and Bank of England, December 2012).  
Melaschenko and Reynolds (2013) argue that allocating losses to debt issued by a pre-
existing holding company that owns the bank is likely to entail an unnecessary cost arising 
from “structural subordination,” because debt issued by the holding company is de facto 
junior in the credit hierarchy to any debt issued by the operating bank subsidiary – and is 
therefore more expensive.11
                                                          
11 Standard &Poors is changing the criteria for assigning issue credit ratings to certain hybrid 
capital instruments subject to bail-in.  While noting the geographic expansion of bail-in powers, 
Standard &Poors considers that the predictability of risks to senior unsecured debt holders remains 
relatively high.  Such changes will by themselves increase the cost of this type of debt. (see, 
“Increasing Bail-In Risks For Bank Hybrid Capital Instruments Are Behind Our Proposed Criteria 
Change” 
  Huertas (2013) makes a similar criticism and he goes even 
further highlighting that the implementation of single receivership at parent holding 
company is easy only if the parent holds 100% of bail-inable debt in a location where it is 
accessible to the parent country authorities.  Also in practice, losses occur at the bank 
subsidiary level so that bail-in at the parent does not itself recapitalize the bank 
subsidiary.  In turn, if the bank subsidiaries issue bail-inable debt, the geographic location 
https://www.globalcreditportal.com/ratingsdirect/RatingsDirect_Commentary_1255846_02_10_2
014_08_14_17.articlePDF?rand=ebDflp1AdZ&id=1255846&sourceId=&type=&outputType=&from
=Alert&prvReq=&pager.offset=&SIMPLE_SEARCH_TYPE=&CONID=&entl=&requestFrom=getPDF&
articleType=Commentary,  6 February, 2014).
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and the legal enforceability of its loss absorbing capacity may be a major problem (unless 
the law under which a liability is issued recognizes the power of the home country 
resolution authority).12
Last but not least, a successful single receivership at parent holding company strategy 
demands a certainty that the home authority would allow resources generated by 
recapitalization at holding company level to be down-streamed within the group.  
   
In practice, the large continental European banks and in particular G-SIB´s have issued less 
senior debt at the parent company and more at the subsidiary level than their US 
counterparts.  
 
International banking groups that operate in the EU will have also to abide by the FSB´s 
specifications and requirements as regards the G-SIBs and the respective Crisis 
Management Groups (CMG) as well as institution specific cooperation agreements 
(COAGs) for planning and crisis resolution.13  The interaction of the FSB CMG and COAGs 
with the EU cross border resolution structures envisaged in Title V of the RRD as well as 
the Single Resolution Authority crisis management framework demand urgent clarification 
and development.14
                                                          
12 Many banks deliberately hold their debt in non-accessible jurisdictions eg Jersey 
 Also, consistent with the FSB Key Attributes, EU countries resolution 
13  In November 2013,  the FSB published the list of G-SIBs: HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Barclays, BNP Paribas, 
Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Bank of America,  Credit Suisse, Goldman Sachs, Group Crédit Agricole, Mitsubishi 
UFJ FG, Morgan Stanley, Royal Bank of Scotland, UBS, Bank of China,Bank of New York Mellon, BBVA, 
Groupe BPCE, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Limited,  ING Bank, Mizuho FG, Nordea, Santander, 
Société Générale, Standard Chartered,State Street, Sumitomo Mitsui FG, Unicredit Group and Wells Fargo  
(see https://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_131111.pdf accessed 29 January, 2014).   
 
14 The SSM will be responsible of ensuring that institutions prepare and regularly update recovery plans and 
the SSM will have the power to arrest a deterioration of bank´s financial condition. 
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authorities, including the Single Resolution Authority, should take into consideration the 
impact of their decisions on third countries financial stability although such assessment is 
not envisaged in the RRD. 
 
4- Third party relations with resolution authorities in the European Banking Union 
A single resolution regime is one of the cornerstones of the European Banking Union.   The 
RRD is just a first step that relies in the principle of regulatory harmonization at the 
highest level as well as on a network of national authorities to resolve banks.  At the time 
of writing, policy makers have agreed the institutional design of the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM) around a Single Resolution Authority (SRA) which will be responsible for 
resolving crisis banks in the euro area (and in the future other participating countries) 
ensuring a uniform approach.15 The Single Resolution Mechanism only extends to banks 
established in Member States participating in the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM)16 
and subject to the supervision of the ECB and the national competent authorities within 
the framework of the SSM.17
 
     
                                                          
15 The new SRM is expected to be in operation at the beginning of 2015 (see the European Council 
Agreement of 18th December, 2013 at 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/140193.pdf accessed 24 
January, 2014). 
16 At present, 128 significant banks that include subsidiaries of non euro area, including non EU, banks 
(HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Barclays, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Mitsubishi UFJ FG, UBS, Bank of China, Bank of 
New York Mellon).  The SSM also encompasses also another 3,175 less significant banks.  
17 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013  of 15 October 2013  conferring specific tasks on the European 
Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions, L 287/63. 
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The Regulation establishes uniform rules and procedures for the resolution of credit 
institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution 
Mechanism.18 According to this Regulation, a Board replaces national resolution 
authorities of the participating Member States in their resolution decisions. Such Board 
should ideally be a European Union agency with a specific structure corresponding to its 
tasks and with legal personality. The Resolution Board will consist of a chair person, four 
full-time appointed members and the resolution authorities of all participating member 
states.19  The Board will decide on a particular resolution scheme and instruct national 
resolution authorities. While the decision for actual resolution of a credit institution 
including the decision on the choice of resolution tools and its financing remains with the 
Resolution Board, the Council, acting on a proposal by the EU Commission may overturn 
the Board’s decision on the grounds that it is not necessary for the public interest or the 
Council may approve or object to material modification of funding by the Single 
Resolution Fund.20
                                                          
18 Proposed Regulation establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit 
institutions and certain investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single 
Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council. 
  The Resolution Board is responsible for decisions on financing 
19 The Board upon notification of the ECB that the bank is failing or likely to fail, or on its own initiative after 
having previously informed the ECB will place an institution under resolution and will decide on the 
application of the resolution tools and the use of the single resolution fund. 
20 Single Resolution Mechanism. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing uniform rules and a uniform procedure for the resolution of credit institutions and certain 
investment firms in the framework of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and 
amending Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council (approval of the 
final compromise text). Council of the European Union.  Brussels, 27 March, 2014. 
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arrangements in the event of the resolution group with institutions in both SRM-
participating and non-participating EU and non EU countries.   
 
Against this background, the Resolution Board should also replace national resolution 
authorities for the purposes of the cooperation with non-participating Member States as 
far as the resolution functions are concerned.  Also, the Resolution Board will take the 
responsibilities of euro area national resolution authorities regarding recognition and 
enforcement of third country resolution proceedings as well as their right to refuse 
recognition of third country resolution proceedings.  Moreover, it is expected that the 
Resolution Board will also take over from participating resolution authorities in the non 
binding bilateral agreements with third country resolution authorities.  This mandate 
opens the possibility of bundling euro area countries existing bilateral agreements with 
third country resolution authorities. For example, all the existing bilateral agreements of 
the euro area countries with the respective agencies in the United States of America could 
be merged into one common agreement.   
 
Since the Resolution Board replaces national resolution authorities of the participating 
Member States in their resolution decisions, the Board should also replace those 
authorities for the purposes of the cooperation with non-participating Member States as 
far as the resolution functions are concerned including the responsibilities of the 
Resolution Colleges of euro area competent authorities in which third country resolution 
authorities can participate as observers.   
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The proposed Regulation establishes that the Regulation establishing the European 
Banking Authority  21
 The Resolution Board should ensure that the decision making structures of resolution 
are legally sound and effective in times of crisis. The Board is empowered to assess third 
country resolution procedures for its recognition and enforcement or alternatively for 
the exercise of the right to refuse such recognition as explained in Section 3.1 above.   
The latter would imply that the Board could recommend that resolution of domestic 
branches of third country institutions is necessary in the public interest.    In such case, 
the Board, is expected to: (i) assess the systemic threat of the foreign branch and 
 should be amended in order to include the Board in the concept of 
competent authorities established by that Regulation. Such assimilation between the 
Board and national competent authorities is consistent with the functions attributed to 
EBA pursuant to Article 25 of Regulation No 1093/2010 to contribute and participate 
actively in the development and coordination of recovery and resolution plans and to aim 
at the facilitation of the resolution of failing institutions and, in particular, cross border 
groups.  Regarding cross border groups, it includes EBA non-binding agreements with third 
country resolution authorities in those instances in which euro area countries and, in the 
future all members of the SSM, are hosts of subsidiaries and branches of international 
banks legally incorporated in a third country or home of subsidiaries and branches of 
international banks.  
                                                          
21 Regulation (EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending 
Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC,  L331/12 
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conclude that there is no prospect of any private sector solutions involving a solvent 
acquirer bank and no third country resolution proceeding has been or will be initiated in 
a reasonable time frame; (ii) propose the necessary resolution tools and their funding 
and (iii) ensure  their implementation by relevant national resolution authorities in the 
euro area countries.   Furthermore, the Board is expected to centralize cooperation with the 
FSB regarding Global SIFIs that operate in the participating countries. 
The preferable resolution strategy depends on the organizational structure of 
international banks:  whether they operate as globally integrated firms or as banks with 
multiple regional subsidiaries and neither of them is a priori superior.  Notwithstanding, 
the centralization of the decision to resolve a bank and of the preparation of resolution 
actions in the Resolution Board will simplify the multiple point of entry of globally 
integrated banks that are headquartered in the euro area (and any other country 
participating in the SSM) as well as for those headquartered in third countries with 
subsidiaries in the euro area.  Moreover, it would facilitate single-point-of-entry 
resolution strategy for those international banks that, operating in the SSM, use the 
single-point-of-entry resolution strategy (in practice international banks operating in the 
euro area also operate internationally limiting the benefits of such simplification).  The 
Resolution Board would decide on the use of the bail in resolution tool at the home 
and/or host country level within the SSM, which is key to the success of the single-point-
of-entry resolution strategy.    
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5- Final reflections 
In line with the internationally accepted best practices, the RRD enshrines the principle of 
recognition and enforcement of third country resolution proceedings. This general 
principle has two implications:  first, the RRD defines the different forms of cooperation 
with third country resolution authorities, which are either home of non EU international 
parent banks that have subsidiaries or branches established in any Member State or host 
of subsidiaries or branches whose parent banks are legally incorporated in the EU and; 
second, in the case of foreign branches of non-EU banks, the RRD establishes the 
circumstances under which a Member State has the right to refuse recognition of third 
country resolution laws and regulations. 
In accordance with the Treaty, the RRD envisages cooperation with third country 
resolution authorities in the context of agreements with one or more third countries that 
should make provision for all the banks located in the that / those countr(ies) and they will 
not be institution specific arrangements.  Until such agreements are in place, competent 
authorities of Member States and EBA are put on an equal foot to enter into non binding 
bilateral agreements with third country resolution authorities with the only obligation of 
information about non binding unilateral agreements on the part of the Member State to 
EBA .  Such simultaneity may result in duplications and over and under laps of coverage. 
Promising areas of cooperation in the context of EBA and bilateral cooperation 
agreements are those related to the transfer of funds or capital from the parent bank to 
the subsidiary as an alternative to bail-in; the location of gone concern loss absorbing 
capacity within the international banking group; treatment of intragroup liabilities in 
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resolution as well as international legal enforceability and mutual recognition of the home 
and host laws under which debt considered loss absorbing are issued. 
 Third country resolution authorities may participate as observers in resolution colleges if 
the EU participating resolution authorities so decide.  Ideally, all forms of cooperation 
should be established at the time of the authorization of the foreign subsidiary/branch or 
the establishment of the supervisory / resolution colleges and, in any event, before the 
bank enters into resolution.    
These cooperation structures as well as confidentiality requirements will have to interact 
with the FSB’s institution-specific cross border group resolution structures (CMG and 
CoAGs) in the case of the SSM participating (at present euro area) banks that are home or 
host of G-SIBs. 22
Member States have the right to refuse recognition or enforcement of third country 
resolution proceedings in the case of foreign branches legally established in the EU.  Such 
exceptions are based on financial stability concerns and / or legal grounds, including the 
existence of no reciprocity.  In sum, it should be based on the defense of the public 
 
resolution proceedings) and obligations (i.e. non binding bilateral agreements with third 
country resolution authorities. While the decision for actual resolution of a credit 
                                                          
22 HSBC, JP Morgan Chase, Barclays, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, Group Crédit 
Agricole, Mitsubishi UFJ FG, UBS, Bank of China, Bank of New York Mellon, BBVA, Groupe BPCE, ING Bank, 
Santander, Société Générale and Unicredit Group. 
interest. 
In the context of the banking union, the regulation only envisages that the Resolution 
Board will take the responsibilities of euro area national resolution authorities regarding 
their rights (i.e. to recognize or refuse recognition or enforcement of third country 
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institution including the decision on the choice of resolution tools and as well as on the 
use of the Single Resolution Fund remains with the Resolution Board, the Council based on 
a proposal by the EU Commission may object to the Board’s decision to the bank 
resolution scheme or may approve or object to material modification of the funding of 
resolution via the Single Resolution Fund.    
In the case of G-SIBs that operate in the euro area (and any future member of the SSM),  
the Single Resolution Authority will have also to abide by the FSB´s specifications and 
requirements and the respective Crisis Management Groups (CMG) as well as institution 
specific cooperation agreements (COAGs) for planning and crisis resolution. 
* Huertas, Thomas F. (2013) “The Case for Bail-ins” in Patrick Kenadjian, (ed.) The Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive: Europe's Solution for "Too Big to Fail" (Berlin: de 
Gruyter, 2013): 167-188. 
 
*Melaschenko, Paul and Noel Reynolds (2013),  A template for recapitalizing too-big-to-
fail banks.  BIS Quarterly Review, June 2013. 
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ANNEX:   
Bank resolution general principles and tools as envisaged in the Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of 
credit institutions and investment firms. 
The Directive enshrines general principles governing resolution: 
– shareholders take first losses; 
– creditors bear losses after shareholders in accordance with priority; 
– senior management is replaced; 
– creditors of the same class are treated in an equitable manner; 
– no creditor incurs greater losses that they would have incurred under 
liquidation.  
The Directive harmonizes: 
–  early intervention measures by bank supervisors to the highest standards.  
In particular, prudential supervisors now can:  
- require shareholders to support the institution with cash; 
- replace managers; 
- implement recovery plan; 
- divestment of activities; 
- appoint special management. 
– bank resolution tools when authorities use an administrative resolution 
procedure: 
- sale of business; 
- bridge bank; 
- asset separation; 
- debt write down. 
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- Sale of business: 
• sale of business to a purchaser (not Bridge Bank) without obtaining 
the consent of the shareholders:  
- shares / other instruments of ownership; 
- all  or specified assets, rights or liabilities; 
- combination of the two above; 
• proceeds of sale to shareholders or benefit institution under 
resolution.  
- Bridge bank: 
• legal entity that is wholly or partially owned by one or more public 
authorities created for the purpose of carrying out some or all the 
functions of an institution under resolution and for holding some or 
all of the assets and liabilities of an institution under resolution; 
• positive net worth; 
• temporary because it aims at privatization. 
- Asset separation tool:  
• resolution authorities have the power to transfer assets, rights or 
liabilities of an institution under resolution to an Asset Management 
Vehicle -legal entity that is wholly owned by one or more public 
authorities-  
• if the situation of the particular market for the transferred assets is 
of such nature that the liquidation of those assets under normal 
insolvency proceedings could have an adverse effect on the 
financial markets. 
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- Bail-in tool: 
• conservation mechanism to absorb losses of institutions failing or 
likely to fail (“trigger”) in order to save the firm from failure;  
• purposes: 
- recapitalization above the regulatory minimum - 
quantitative requirement for bail-in is not a target but a 
minimum of 8% of banks‘ total liabilities including own 
funds-  
- equity conversion;  
- reduction principal amount of claims / debt in order to 
facilitate (1) bridge bank and/or (2) sale of business/Asset 
separation tool; 
- it goes hand in hand with recovery and reorganization 
measures reflected in the Business Reorganization Plan 
aimed at restoring long term viability.  
• Authorities can interfere on creditors rights without having 
exhausted shareholders´ rights: 
- “carve-out” approach to bail-in (vs “waterfall”).National 
discretion for exclusions from bail-in is limited; 
- “no creditor worse off” when “necessary exclusions from 
bail-in“ would need to be compensated with other financing 
arrangements such as Bank Resolution Funds (BRFs) or 
“other.” The participation of BRFs is topped to a maximum 
of 5% of failed banks´ total liabilities; 
- European Commission’s immediate approval needed; 
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- State Aid rules for crisis banks to make sure that 
shareholders and subordinated debt-holders' contribute to 
recapitalizations or asset protection measures before 
resorting to public money.  
• Scope of bail-inable debt: applies to all liabilities except:  
- insured depositors; 
- interbank liabilities < 7 days;   
- secured liabilities;  
- fiduciary assets protected by the insolvency law; 
- liabilities to employees, a commercial or trade creditor, tax 
and social security authorities. 
• Conditions to qualify: 
- contractual provisions governing any eligible liability that 
inform investors  about the priority of claims in case of 
resolution and liquidation; 
- authorities´ assessment of their legal enforceability;  
- bail in is still enforceable even if institution fails to include 
the contractual provision.   
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